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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the differences and the causes for the differences between 
external and internal auditors regarding the perceived levels of fraud detection of the 42 red flags 
found in Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99.  SAS No. 99 requires the 42 red flags to be 
used in financial statement audits in order to detect fraudulent financial reporting activity.  No 
differences were found between external and internal auditors with respect to overall perceptions.  
However, 17 of the 42 red flags had significant differences regarding the effectiveness of red flags in 
the detection of fraud.  For the external auditors, the extent of use and exposure to red flags were 
significant predictors regarding perceived effectiveness.  For internal auditors, perceived fraud-
detecting effectiveness was a function of one’s internal and total audit experience.  Surprisingly, 
gender differences occurred with both external and internal auditors with females rating the red flag 
effectiveness consistently higher than male auditors.  With the exception of two red flags, external 
auditors displayed a higher degree of consensus regarding the effectiveness rating of each red flag 
than internal auditors.  When asked to identify the more effective red flags based on the SAS No. 99 
categories, both groups of auditors perceived the attitude/rationalization red flag category as the 
most effective red flags.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
uditors use many procedures in attesting to the accuracy of financial statements.  One of the 
procedures is the use of red flags which might act as indicators that fraudulent financial reporting is 
occurring. For external auditors, the Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, The 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2003) which superseded SAS No. 53, was one of the 
first statements that identified 25 fraud risk factors (red flags).  This standard was later replaced by SAS No. 99 
(AICPA, 2003) that requires auditors to use 42 red flags in financial statement audits to detect fraudulent financial 
reporting.  For an internal auditor, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) put forth the Statement on Internal Auditing 
Standards (SIAS) No. 3 (IIA, 2005) which stated that “internal auditors should have sufficient knowledge of fraud to 
be able to identify indicators (red flags) that fraud might have been committed.”  Both external and internal auditors, 
therefore, are expected to know and understand the importance and use of red flags in detecting fraud. 
 
As a result of the demise of Enron and WorldCom, auditors‟ responsibilities to detect fraud have increased 
over time, and the tools to detect fraud should become even more important.  Elliott (2002) further argues that 
unintentional errors will most likely be caught by technology, and that the future of the profession will hinge on the 
auditor‟s ability to detect fraud. In hindsight, are companies becoming so complex that fraudulent activity is now 
easily accomplished?  It is most likely that red flags were present in these previously mentioned companies where 
fraudulent activity took place.  So why weren‟t red flags acted upon by the auditors?  Was it possible that neither 
external nor internal auditors knew that red flags existed?  Did the auditors recognize the red flags but chose to ignore 
A 
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them because they judged the red flags to be unimportant or of little consequence?  Recent headlines demonstrate that 
the SEC will no longer tolerate this negligence (Scannel, 2006). 
 
 In order to prevent red flags from being viewed as simply a list of ineffective and unrelated cues (Asare and 
Wright, 2004) or being too long of a list, where dilution effects might occur due to irrelevant information (Waller and 
Zimbelman, 2003).  The list of red flags found in SAS No. 99 is organized based on the fraud-triangle concept 
(Albrecht et al., 1995) which involves the interaction of the following three factors:  incentive, opportunity, and 
attitude.  Based on this fraud-triangle concept, Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) state “if fraud checklists incorporate this 
theory, auditors should be better able to process fraud cues.” 
 
PURPOSE FOR THE STUDY 
 
 This study examines the perceived effectiveness of red flags in the detection of fraudulent financial 
statements between external and internal auditors.  Based on the severe consequences of not recognizing red flags 
(Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen), it is important to understand the extent of use and perceived effectiveness 
of red flags.  This study attempts to identify any differences between external and internal auditors in their perceived 
fraud-detecting effectiveness of SAS No. 99 red flags.  In addition, we explore why some auditors would perceive red 
flags to be ineffective in detecting fraudulent activity, while others consider the same red flag as very effective in 
fraud detection. 
 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
 The use of red flags as an audit tool has been researched extensively.  However, the number of prior research 
studies examining the perceived effectiveness of red flags is limited.  The following studies examine the wide range of 
red flag effectiveness among auditing professionals in the detection of fraudulent financial reporting activity. 
 
Albrecht and Romney (1986) used audit partners in their study of red flags and management fraud.  Their 
results showed that partners perceived that only one-third of the red flags were considered significant predictors of 
fraud.  These significant red flags tended to be personal characteristics of management rather than company-specific 
variables.  Indicators of fraud concerning management are the attitude/rationalization red flags stated in SAS No. 99. 
 
In a study conducted by Heiman-Hoffman and Morgan (1996), external auditors from one of the then Big Six 
public accounting firms were asked to rank the thirty most important warning signs (i.e., red flags) of possible fraud.  
This study emphasized the fact that red flags or warning signs did carry different weights as perceived by the sample 
of auditors.  The results showed the auditors tended to rate “management attitudes” as the most important category of 
red flags compared to other organizational factors.  Within “management attitudes,” auditors identified the most 
important red flag to be client dishonesty.  Management attitudes represent one of the three categories of red flags that 
are required to be used by external auditors in financial statement audits. 
 
 Pincus (1989) examined the efficacy use of red flags among auditors.  In her study, Pincus found that only 
half of the respondents indicated they used red flag questionnaires to assist in their fraud assessment, since they 
considered red flags an important tool in the audit process.  However, for the other respondents, one may conclude 
that non-use of red flag questionnaires indicates these auditors did not perceive red flags to be good indicators of 
fraudulent activity. 
 
Hackenbrack (1993) explored the perceived importance of red flags among auditors with clients of varying 
sizes.  His results showed a wide range of variance in the importance ratings of fraud risk factors.  Differences in 
auditors' experiences between large and small clients were found to account for much of the variability in the ratings 
of red flags.  Auditors assigned primarily to large-client engagements placed more emphasis on factors (red flags) 
relating to the opportunities of perpetuators to commit fraud than auditors examining small clients.  Opportunities to 
commit fraud represent another category of SAS No. 99 red flags.  
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While the previously cited studies limit their samples to external auditors, other studies examining red flag 
importance include both internal and external auditors.  Apostolou et al. (2001) surveyed both external and internal 
auditors.  In this study, all auditors were asked to rate the importance of the twenty-five red flags found in SAS No. 
82.  Management characteristics and influence over the control environment were the highest rated indicators (red 
flags) by the sample of auditors.  Interestingly, no significant differences were discovered between external and 
internal auditors.  Also, no differences were found between CPA firms of different sizes regarding their perceived 
importance of these indicators. 
 
With respect to internal auditor research, Apostolou and Hassell (1993) surveyed 126 internal auditors to 
investigate red flags.  The respondents were asked to rate the importance of red flags that might indicate the possible 
occurrence of management fraud.  Similar to their latest research, the auditors were found to be very consistent in their 
judgments concerning no significant differences related to the importance of red flags. 
 
Under a variety of hypothetical situations, Church et al. (2001) surveyed internal auditors‟ perceived 
importance of red flags.  The results indicate that auditors considered fraud to be more probable under certain red 
flags such as income-surpassing expectations and managers‟ bonuses based on earnings. 
 
Gramling and Myers (2003) examined internal auditors perceptions regarding 43 warning signs (red flags) 
categorized as follows: 14 represent incentive or pressure conditions, 16 represent opportunity conditions, and 13 
represent attitude or rationalization conditions.  Their results indicate the most important warning sign involves factors 
related to attitude or rationalization.  Of the top 15 indicators, six represent attitude or rationalization conditions, three 
represent incentive conditions, and six represent opportunity conditions.  In addition, four out of the six attitudes or 
rationalization conditions were rated as the most important of any red flag indicators. 
 
Similar to Gramling and Myers (2003), a study conducted by Moyes et al. (2005) also asked internal auditors 
to rate the perceived importance of red flags based on SAS No. 99.  In this study, the red flags were categorized into 
three groups: opportunities, incentives or pressures, and attitudes or rationalizations.  The results show that internal 
auditors consistently rated red flags categorized as opportunity and attitudes/rationalizations as more effective in 
detecting fraudulent financial reporting activity than red flags labeled incentives/pressures. 
 
In summary, the results from previous research are quite consistent.  It is apparent that most auditors consider 
red flags to be an important part of the audit process.  However, all red flags do not appear to be equally important.  
There appears to be some disparity among auditors regarding their agreement on the importance and use of red flags.  
SAS No. 99 requires that CPAs use 42 red flags in conducting financial statement audits.  Internal auditors also use 
these red flags as well.  This study will add to the body of knowledge by examining the perceptions of both external 
and internal auditors regarding SAS No. 99 red flags as fraudulent financial reporting indicators.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Experience 
 
 Hackenbrack (1993) examined experience relative to an auditors‟ employment with large versus small clients 
rather than an individual auditor‟s overall audit experience.  With most fraud being well hidden, it is theorized that it 
requires more experienced auditors who have developed the expertise that is necessary to use red flags correctly in 
order to recognize fraud.  Relatively new and inexperienced auditors lack the intangible qualities accumulated over 
years of experience.  Therefore, inexperienced auditors will not recognize in the same manner as experienced ones 
that red flags are effective for detecting red flags.  The first hypothesis involves three types of work experience: 
external auditing experience, internal auditing experience, and total auditing experience.  
 
Ha1: More experienced auditors will perceive red flags to be more effective in the detection of fraudulent financial 
statements than inexperienced auditors.  
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Training 
 
 While it is possible that experience is an important factor in perceived importance of red flags, Green and 
Calderon (1996) suggest that training is a viable option for enabling one to identify risk factors.  Based on this, an 
auditor‟s training in the use of red flags should have a significant impact on the perceived effectiveness of red flags in 
detecting fraudulent activity.  Therefore, it is theorized that auditors who have received red flag training should be 
able to recognize the importance of red flags in the detection of fraud more than auditors with little or no training.  
The second hypothesis includes three types of red flag training: conferences, in-house training, and CPE hours. 
 
Ha2: Auditors with more red flag training will perceive red flags to be more effective in the detection of fraudulent 
financial statements than auditors with less training in the use of red flags.  
 
Exposure to Red Flags 
 
 While it is likely that more experienced auditors should tend to have more exposure to red flags, this is not 
necessarily the case.  Albrecht and Romney (1986) examined audit partners who should have a great deal of audit 
experience, yet they perceived only one-third of the red flags to be significant predictors of fraud.  It is theorized that 
real exposure to red flags in the workplace will an impact auditor‟s perception of the effectiveness of red flags versus 
one who has only a conceptual knowledge of red flags.  In a study by Pincus (1989), one-half of the respondents 
admitted to using red flags and only those auditors who had used red flags felt that red flags were very effective in 
detecting fraudulent activity.  As such, the third hypothesis deals with exploring exposure to red flags which includes 
the following:  the extent of exposure, how often one uses red flags, the organization‟s effectiveness in using red flags, 
and the detection of fraud due to using red flags.  The detection of red flags refers to the actual identification of a red 
flag during an audit and acting upon it.  This type of exposure is more “hands on,” and those auditors who have 
actually done this are most likely to perceive red flags as a very valuable tool in the detection of fraudulent activity.    
Therefore, it is theorized that users perceive red flags as very effective, while non-users will rate red flag effectiveness 
much lower. 
 
Ha3: Auditors who have more exposure to red flags will perceive red flags to be more effective in the detection of 
fraudulent financial statements than auditors who have not been exposed to red flags.   
 
Firm Size 
 
 While Heiman-Hoffman and Morgan (1996) and Apostolou et al. (2001) examined auditors from a then Big 
Six accounting firm, no other studies examined the relationship between the size of the firm that an auditor worked for 
and red flag effectiveness.  Firm size is treated as a surrogate for the corporate culture inherent within all 
organizations.  It is theorized that this corporate culture may have an impact on the auditor‟s perception of the 
effectiveness of red flags.  As such, it is proposed that auditors from larger firms are most likely to perceive red flags 
as more effective due to the distinct corporate culture found in the large firms.  In addition, the larger accounting firms 
are more likely to come across red flag indicators in the audit of large clients than the smaller firms.  Thus, large firms 
should stress the importance of red flags more than small firms auditing smaller clients. 
 
Ha4: Auditors from larger firms will perceive red flags to be more effective in the detection of fraudulent financial 
statements than auditors from smaller firms.  
 
Gender 
 
 The literature is mixed concerning differences between male and females.  There are no studies that examine 
the relationship between an auditor‟s gender and the perceived effectiveness of red flags.  Could one gender identify a 
red flag whereas the other gender would not?  Would both genders perceive red flags the same or differently?  Foster 
et al. (2003) found that males and females are equally adept at technology, but significant differences occurred 
between genders when assessing controls.  Would this indicate possible differences in red flag perceptions?  Schwartz 
and Wallin (2002) reported that „distance‟ from actual fraud occurrence impacts one‟s choice and over time, no 
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differences were found between male and females in the rate of fraudulent disclosures.  In another study, Chung and 
Monroe (2001) concluded that females are more accurate decision makers in complex tasks than males.  Is there 
enough evidence to suggest that gender might impact the perceived effectiveness of red flags?  Would one gender 
ignore an obvious red flag?  It might be the males that ignores rather than the females as many studies have found 
females to be more ethically sensitive than their male counterparts as found in Sweeney (1995) and Cohen et al. 
(1998).  In accounting education at the university level, females are in the majority (Nelson et al., 2002) and will 
continue until they become the majority in a male-dominated profession.  With females dominating the accounting 
major and more females entering the profession, audit teams will be a mix of both genders.  Similar thinking is crucial 
and differences need to be identified.  As such, the following hypothesis is examined. 
 
Ha5: There will be differences in the perceived level of effectiveness of red flags in the detection of fraudulent 
financial statements between male and female auditors.  
 
External versus Internal Auditors 
 
 Apostolou et al. (2001) examined the perceptions of the effectiveness of fraud indicators and found no 
differences between external and internal auditors.  This study examines these same groups to see if this is still true.  
While external and internal auditors essentially use the same audit tools in financial audits, it is proposed that internal 
auditors have a better working knowledge of what is happening in their organizations based on being exposed to 
financial information on a daily basis.  This greater exposure may cause internal auditors to be more aware of 
occurrence of red flags.  Therefore, internal auditor‟s perceptions may tend to be stronger than external auditor 
perceptions.  On the basis of this, four hypotheses are examined.  The first hypothesis examines the overall perceived 
effectiveness of all red flags.  In general, internal auditors believe that red flags are more effective in detecting fraud 
in financial statements than external auditors. 
 
Ha6: There will be differences in the overall perceived effectiveness of red flags in the detection of fraudulent 
financial statements between external and internal auditors. 
 
 The next hypothesis examines the extent of agreement among each group of auditors.  An average rating can 
be very misleading without examining the distribution of responses from the auditors surveyed.  A wider distribution 
of responses or a large standard deviation associated with each red flag may be indicative of a lack of agreement 
among the auditors, whereas a more narrow distribution of responses or a small variance may indicate a strong 
agreement among the auditors concerning their perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of each red flag.  
 
Ha7: There will be differences in the variance for each red flag‟s level of effectiveness in the detection of 
fraudulent financial statements between external and internal auditors.  
 
 Previous studies such as Apostolou and Hassell (1993), Church et al. (2001), Gramling and Myers (2003), 
and Moyes et al. (2005) indicate that all red flags are not equally weighted among and between external and internal 
auditors.  This hypothesis examines the extent of agreement between external and internal auditors concerning which 
of the 42 red flags found in SAS No. 99 are the most effective versus those red flags identified as not effective. 
 
Ha8: There will be differences in each red flag‟s perceived level of effectiveness in the detection of fraudulent 
financial statements between external and internal auditors. 
 
 SAS No. 99 categorizes the red flag indicators into three groups: attitude/rationalization, opportunity, and 
incentives/pressures.  Previous studies (Heiman-Hoffman and Morgan (1996), Gramling and Myers (2003), Moyes et 
al. (2005) have consistently found that attitude/rationalization are the most effective red flags.  Hackenbrack‟s (1993) 
results however, rated the opportunity red flags as most effective.  Based on these classifications, this study examines 
the following hypotheses: 
 
Ha9: There will be differences in each red flag‟s perceived level of effectiveness in the detection of fraudulent 
financial statements based on the three SAS No. 99 categories between external and internal auditors. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 The questionnaire was designed based on 42 red flags identified in SAS No. 99 which fall into three 
categories:  attitude/rationalizations, opportunity, and incentive/pressures.  However, these red flags were randomly 
ordered in the questionnaire to avoid any bias by the respondents.  Cox (1980) recommends a five-point to a nine-
point scale as appropriate scaling when the respondents are sophisticated with respect to what is being measured.  For 
this study, each red flag was evaluated by the auditors on a Likert scale with values from one to six („not effective‟ to 
„extremely effective‟) based on the perceived effectiveness of the red flag in detecting fraudulent financial activity.     
 
 The content, readability, and validity of the questionnaire were pilot tested by accounting professors and 
Texas CPA practitioners, whose suggestions were incorporated into the questionnaire.  In addition, as a measure of 
internal validity, Cronbach‟s alpha was calculated for each group of auditor responses.  A Cronbach‟s alpha value of 
0.96 was found for the external auditor responses and a value of 0.97 calculated for the data from internal auditors.  
These values indicate a high degree of internal validity for a questionnaire of this type. 
 
 The questionnaire also contained demographic questions concerning the auditors‟ experiences with red flags, 
job title, work experience, educational background, certifications, gender, race, and income level. 
 
Sample 
 
The researchers purchased a list of its members from the AICPA, who were randomly scattered across the 
United States.  Using both U.S. postal service and emails, 2,000 questionnaires were sent and data were collected over 
a 6-month period.  There were 128
1
 usable questionnaires representing a response rate of 6.4 percent, which is normal 
for this type of research given the size and complexity of the survey instrument. 
 
For the internal auditors, the researchers posted the questionnaire to the Global Auditing Information 
Network (GAIN), an affiliation of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA).  There are approximately 1,800 internal 
auditors who are members of GAIN and scattered across the United States.  Survey data were collected over a six-
month period, which resulted in 100 usable questionnaires from internal auditors representing a response rate of 5.6 
percent.  Both response rates are relatively low for two reasons:  (1) the red flag questionnaire was very long in length, 
and (2) the red flags are a difficult subject for both external and internal auditors to understand and to be able to 
evaluate their effectiveness.  Several auditors commented that they did not have the experience and expertise to judge 
the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of the 42 red flags.    
 
A test for non-response bias was conducted on samples of both the external and internal auditors to determine 
if sample responses were representative of the total population.  For this test, late respondents were used as proxies for 
non-respondents (Oppenheim, 2001).  Hotellings T
2
 was used to test the equality of the multivariate means of the first 
and second mailings.  The results of the test indicate no significant differences between early and late respondents.   
Therefore, non-response does not exist in this study. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
For each of 42 red flags listed on the questionnaire, the auditors would evaluate the level of fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of each red flag by selecting one of the six following responses (a six-point Likert scale): 
 
1 Not Effective 
2 Seldom Effective 
3 Somewhat Effective 
                                                 
1  Of the 128 usable responses, 17 did not work in public accounting.  For statistical analyses purposes, 111 are classified as 
external auditors. 
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4 Mostly Effective 
5 Very Effective 
6 Extremely Effective 
 
The auditor responses recorded on the received questionnaires were entered into a database.    Then, a mean 
was calculated from all the responses from external auditors or internal auditors for each of the 42 red flags.  Each 
mean represents the level of effectiveness of each red flag in detecting fraud perceived by external auditors or internal 
auditors.  T-tests and the Wilcoxon Rank Sum
2
 tests were conducted in order to determine whether significant 
differences existed between external and internal auditors with respect to their perceived level of effectiveness of red 
flags as predictors of fraudulent financial reporting activity. 
 
 In order to examine the within-group level of agreement for each red flag, the variance for each of the 42 red 
flags by each auditor group was calculated.  The variance will indicate the dispersion of responses and show whether 
or not some degree of agreement has been reached concerning the effectiveness of each red flag.  For example, the 
higher the variance, the less agreement among the group of auditors exists.    
 
Regression analysis was conducted as a method for determining the reason why an auditor might choose a 
particular level of effectiveness for a given red flag.  An aggregate mean was calculated based on every auditor‟s 
response to a specific red flag within external auditors, internal auditors, and both groups combined.  These calculated 
means represent the overall perceived level of effectiveness rating of each red flag and act as the dependent variable.  
The following reported demographic items act as independent variables that might provide insight concerning why 
differences in perception may exist:  various types of experience, training and conferences, exposure to red flags, use 
of red flags, firm size, and gender.   The regression analysis was run three separate times: (1) with external auditors 
only, (2) with internal auditors only, and (3) external and internal auditors combined.  
 
For each of the three SAS No. 99 categories of red flags which included opportunity (OP), incentive or 
pressures (IP), and attitudes or rationalizations (AR), a mean was calculated individually for each red flag and 
aggregately for all the red flags.  On an aggregate level, an overall mean for all 42 red flags was computed from all the 
responses of each group of auditors.  For each auditor group, this overall mean represented the average level of fraud-
detecting effectiveness of 42 red flags as a group.  Each individual red flag was tested against the overall mean using a 
t-test in order to classify them as most effective, effective, and less effective.  Red flags rated as most effective in 
detecting fraud had significantly higher means than the overall mean.  Other red flags, where no significant 
differences were found when the mean of each red flag was compared to the overall mean, were rated as effective in 
detecting fraud.  The remaining red flags that had means significantly lower than the overall mean were rated as less 
effective in detecting fraud. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Demographic Information 
 
 As shown in Table 1, the sample of auditors exhibits a wide range of backgrounds.  When asked about their 
exposure to red flags, 69 percent of external auditors and 69 percent of internal auditors were at least „moderately‟ 
exposed to red flags.   When asked how often they used red flags, „frequently‟ was cited by 52 percent of external 
auditors and 50 percent of internal auditors.  A much larger percentage of internal auditors (76 percent) compared to 
external auditors (58 percent) stated they have used red flags to detect fraud.  Conferences that instruct how to use red 
flags to detect fraud were attended by 48 percent of the external auditors and 54 percent of the internal auditors.  
Employers that offered in-house training on red flags to detect fraud were attended by 29 percent of the external 
auditors and 20 percent of the internal auditors.   Slightly more internal auditors attended red flag conferences than 
external auditors, whereas slightly more external auditors attended red flag in-house training provided by employers 
                                                 
2 The Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is the non-parametric version of the t-test.  Both tests were run and in only 3 (out of 42) red flags 
did the t-test results indicate a significant difference and the Wilcoxon test indicated non-significance or vice-versa.  The 
researchers felt this would not have any major impact on the final results of this study. 
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than internal auditors.  The number of CPE hours on red flags was generally the same between the two groups of 
auditors.  With regard to “How effective is your organization in using red flags,” considering the responses from 
„seldom‟ to „somewhat‟ represented 56 percent of the external auditors and 41 percent of the internal auditors, but 
including the responses from „seldom‟ to „mostly‟ represented 80 percent of the external auditors and 83 percent of 
the internal auditors. 
 
Importantly, 58 percent of the external auditors indicated that they have used red flags to detect fraud 
compared to 76 percent of the internal auditors.  More internal auditors used red flags for detecting fraud than external 
auditors, whereas the employers of external and internal auditors had generally similar levels of organizational 
effectiveness in using red flags to detect fraud.   
 
As to professional certification, 100 percent of the external auditors were CPAs with 4 percent being CIAs 
and 3 percent being CMAs.   In comparison, 68 percent of the internal auditors were CPAs with 35 percent being 
CIAs and and 2 percent being CMAs.  While only a few of the external auditors held multiple certifications, many of 
the internal auditors held „CPA‟ and „CIA‟ certificates as well as other certifications. Eighty-four percent of external 
auditors were at the „manager‟ level or higher, while 69 percent of internal auditors were „manager‟ level or higher.   
With respect to experience, 73 percent of external auditors and 73 percent of internal auditors had at least 10 years of 
auditing experience, as well as, 47 percent of external auditors and 39 percent of the internal auditors had more than 
20 years of auditing experience.   Slightly more external auditors are in management and extremely experienced in the 
auditing profession compared to internal auditors. 
 
As for education, all the external and internal auditors graduated with bachelor degrees with master and 
doctoral degrees held by 34 percent of the external auditors and 29 percent of the internal auditors.  Eighty-five 
percent of the external auditors and 76 percent of the internal auditors pursued a major in Accounting.  Slightly more 
external auditors have graduate degrees and majored in Accounting than internal auditors.   With respect to gender, 20 
percent of the external auditors and 28 percent of the internal auditors were females working within a male-dominated 
auditing profession. 
 
Hypothesis One: Experience 
 
 In this hypothesis, it was postulated that an auditor‟s experience would have a significant impact on their 
perception of the effectiveness of red flags.  It was further theorized that the more experience an auditor had or the 
higher position they had in their firm, the more they would know and understand the importance of red flags and also 
tend to agree more regarding those red flags identified as more effective versus those red flags identified as less 
effective.  The results of the statistical analysis are somewhat inconclusive for external auditors.  Table 2 shows the 
results of testing for external auditors and it appears that neither experience nor job position has very much if any 
effect on one‟s perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags.  Surprisingly, it appears external auditing 
experience, internal auditing experience, and total audit work experience has little if any impact on an external 
auditor‟s perceived effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud.  Even, the job position of the external auditor has 
influence upon one‟s perception of the fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags.   Although, at the 10 percent level of 
significance, one may consider that total audit work experience (p = .1149) may be marginally significant to the 
external auditors‟ perceived fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags.  In Table 1, 58 percent of external auditors 
indicated that they had detected fraud by using red flags.   Evidently, 42 percent of the external auditors have detected 
fraud using red flags and may not be convinced of their fraud detecting effectiveness.  The researchers feel further 
examination needs to be conducted in this area.  
 
 For internal auditors, experience does make a difference in one‟s perceptions of red flags.  In Table 2, 
internal auditing experience (p = .0591) and total audit work experience (p = .0865) influenced the internal auditors‟ 
perception of the fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags. Further analysis of this situation found that more 
experienced internal auditors tend to rate the effectiveness of red flags higher than less experienced internal auditors.  
It is interesting to note that opposite findings occurred between external and internal auditors for the experience 
variable.  In Table 1, 76 percent of the internal auditors have used red flags to detect fraud compared to 58 percent of 
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the external auditors.  Internal auditing experience may involve more fraud detection using red flags than external 
auditing experience. 
 
 In addition, internal auditors work all year in the environment of their corporate employers, whereas external 
auditors conduct audits at number corporate clients during the year.  Internal auditors perform compliance, operational 
and financial statement audits, while the external auditors conduct primarily financial statement audits.  Internal 
auditing experience is more diversified in different types of audits than external auditor experience, and internal 
auditors are more knowledgeable about the accounting system of their employers than the external auditors.  More 
diversified audit experience and more knowledge of the accounting system may explain partially why internal auditing 
experience enhances one‟s perception of the fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags. 
 
Hypothesis Two: Training 
 
 Red flag training included conferences, in-house training, and CPE hours taken by auditors.  It is theorized 
that training specifically on red flags would sensitize auditors concerning the importance, use, and effectiveness of red 
flags, so that auditors trained in the use of red flags would perceive the red flags to be more important than those 
auditors with little training.  As shown in Table 2, no significances in perceived fraud-detecting effectiveness were 
found among the various levels of training for either group of auditors.  These findings pose an interesting question: 
does red flag training matter?  It would seem contrary to believe that training would not help an auditor with the use of 
red flags.  At the same time, both external and internal auditors as respondents commented that understanding the 
nature of red flags and evaluating the fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags was difficult.   Considering the 
difficulty associated with red flags, it is conceivable that auditors do not learn how to use red flags from simply 
attending conferences and in-house training.    
 
Hypothesis Three: Exposure to Red Flags 
 
 In this hypothesis, exposure to red flags included the following: the extent of exposure, how often red flags 
are used, an organization‟s effectiveness in using red flags, and the use of red flags to detect fraud.   Table 2 shows 
that external auditors‟ perceived effectiveness of red flags is significant with the following variables: extent of 
exposure to red flags, how often you use red flags, the organization effectiveness in using red flags, and used red flags 
to detect fraud.  In contrast, internal auditors‟ perceived fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags is not significant 
with these above mentioned variables. 
 
 As mentioned before external auditors tend conduct financial statement audits for numerous corporate 
clients.    In compliance with SAS No. 99, the external auditors are required to use these 42 red flags in performing 
these audits with the objective of detecting any occurrence of fraudulent financial reporting activity.   In conducting 
financial statement audits, the individual external auditors are increasing both their exposure to red flags and the 
frequency in using these red flags, which explains the significant relation with their perceived fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of red flags with the extent of their exposure to red flags and how often they use red flags.   In addition, 
as external auditors carry out more financial statement audits, the individual external auditors will, on the average, 
discover more occurrences of fraudulent activities, which will improve the effectiveness of both external auditors and 
their organizations in using red flags to detect fraud.  In contrast, internal auditors do not have as strong of a 
professional standard that requires the usage of red flags during the performance of financial statement audits, and 
thus, it may possibly explain why the internal auditors‟ perceived effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud was not 
significant with the four previously mentioned variables. 
 
It might be argued that exposure to red flags and one‟s experience might be correlated in the fact that as one 
gains more experience in the audit field, one is likely to be more exposed to the use of red flags.  The results of this 
study indicate that these appear to be two separate variables.  Note in hypothesis 1, experience was a significant factor 
with internal auditors but not significant with external auditors.  For instance, exposure to red flags was expected to be 
very significant for internal auditors, but the results show the opposite effect.  For external auditors, exposure to red 
flags impacts their perception of the effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraud. 
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 One of the questions asked of the auditors was “Have you ever used red flags to detect fraud?”  As shown in 
Table 2, not only were significances found for the group of external auditors but those that responded „yes‟ to this 
question tended to perceive higher levels of red flag effectiveness than those external auditors who responded „no‟ to 
this question. 
 
 For the internal auditors, the significant findings found in hypothesis 1 regarding experience and the non-
significant findings for this hypothesis are surprising and unexpected.  It was theorized that internal audit experience 
may include some exposure to red flags
3
 due to the nature of the work which affects an internal auditor‟s perception.  
However, this finding does not appear to be the case, and some other factor inherent in internal audit work accounts 
for the variation in perceived effectiveness and not exposure to red flags.   
 
Hypothesis Four: Firm Size 
 
 Table 2 shows that no significances were found for external auditors with regard to the size of the firm that 
the auditor works with.  This finding is consistent with the results from Apostolou et al. (2001).  Due to the fact the 
firm size question on the questionnaire was written more applicable to CPA firms and not applicable to the 
organizations that employ internal auditors.  For this reason, the internal auditors did not answer this question.  It was 
theorized that the larger firms would tend to place more emphasis on red flags due to their client base, thus increasing 
the importance and perceived effectiveness.  Also, larger firms possess more financial resources to pay for 
conferences and in-house training designed to teach how to use red flags for detecting fraud.   Furthermore, the larger 
firms, which represent international and national CPA firms, require their external auditors to hold both a master of 
accounting degree and CPA license as well as to be competent and knowledgeable about all the auditing and 
accounting standards.   For all these above stated reasons, one would expect external auditors employed with larger 
firms to recognize more the fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags than external auditors employed with smaller 
firms.  In contrast, auditors in smaller firms might not emphasize the use of red flags due to less complex audits of 
smaller clients.  This theory was not supported by the data.  External auditors may still be learning how to use red 
flags effectively to detect fraud, since the relatively new SAS No. 99 became mandatory as of December 15, 2002.  
For this reason, external auditors at larger firms might recognize the fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags more 
than external auditors at smaller firms in the upcoming decade. 
 
Hypothesis Five: Gender 
 
 It is not surprising that significances were found between male and female auditors for both external and 
internal auditor groups as exhibited in Table 2.  What is surprising is that females perceive red flags to be more 
effective than their male counterparts.  For the external auditors, females had a mean of 4.32 whereas males had a 
mean of 4.00.  For internal auditors, females again rated red flags higher (4.21 versus 3.88, respectively).  Females‟ 
tendency to be more attentive to details and the fact that female accounting students have outperformed male 
accounting students may be possible reasons for this outcome.  Another explanation might be the more cautious nature 
of female versus male.  Therefore, females more than males might tend to regard red flags as much more effective in 
order to detect fraud and avoid serious ramifications if the fraudulent activity was occurring but  was not detected. 
 
Hypotheses Six: Aggregate Mean of External and Internal Auditors 
 
 A list of the 42 red flags found in SAS No. 99 is shown in Table 3 with the red flags in descending order 
from most effective to least effective as perceived by external auditors.  In addition, the list of the 42 SAS No. 99 red 
flags is included for the internal auditors.  The aggregate mean for all 42 red flags by external auditors is slightly 
higher at 4.11, while the aggregate mean for internal auditors is 3.98.  No statistical differences were found between 
these groups of auditors with respect to the overall mean (p-value = 0.2370). 
 
                                                 
3 While it was theorized that some exposure to red flags might be part of an internal auditor‟s experience, they were regarded as 
two separate variables.  Correlation coefficients were run for all variables and when examining experience versus „extent of 
exposure,‟ „how often do you use red flags,‟ „organization effective in use of red flags,‟ and „have you used red flags to detect 
fraud,‟ the correlation coefficients were .133, .116, .164, and .169, respectively with none of the coefficients being significant. 
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Hypothesis Seven: Level of Agreement among External and Internal Auditors 
 
 This hypothesis examines the extent of the distribution of responses for each red flag by each of the two 
auditor group.  On the questionnaire, the values of one to six were the possible answers as to the level of fraud-
detecting effectiveness indicated by each auditor.  It was theorized that red flags with lower aggregate means may 
have wider dispersion of auditor responses (larger variances) or less agreement among auditors.  In the same way, 
other red flags with higher aggregate means may have narrower dispersion of auditor responses (smaller variances) or 
more agreement among auditors.   As a measure of this dispersion, the variance was calculated for each of the 42 SAS 
No. 99 red flags for both external and internal auditors as shown in Table 3.  In Table 3, it was expected as the 
aggregate means decrease proceeding the right columns indicating lower perceived levels of fraud-detecting 
effectiveness, the variances or dispersion of auditor responses would tend to generally decrease indicating reducing 
agreements among auditor responses.  In reviewing the means and variances, the inverse relationship between the 
auditors‟ perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness and the extent of agreement among the auditors‟ responses, 
as anticipated, did not happen.  In reality, there is no identifiable relationship appears between the means and 
variances for 42 red flags.    
 
Hypothesis Eight: Individual Red Flag Effectiveness 
 
 As shown in Table 3, 17 of the 42 red flags have significant differences between external and internal 
auditors are found concerning the perceived level of effectiveness.  The t-tests were used to determine these 17 
significant differences that are indicated by asterisks in Table 3.  Four of these 17 red flags are regarded by the 
auditors as the most effective red flags, but significant differences exist between the two groups.  The red flag with the 
highest level of fraud-detecting effectiveness perceived by external auditors is “known history of security violations,” 
while the red flag with highest level of effectiveness red flag perceived by internal auditors is “restrictions placed on 
the auditor.”  These significant differences indicate that the external and internal auditors disagree as to the perceived 
level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of each of the 17 red flags. 
 
Hypothesis Nine: SAS No. 99 Categories 
 
 The top portion of Table 4 shows the 42 red flags divided into the three SAS No. categories: attitude or 
rationalization (AR), opportunity (OP), and incentive or pressure (IP), and subdivided the red flags into three levels of 
fraud-detecting effectiveness perceived by each auditor group: more effective, effective, and less effective.
4
   SAS No. 
99 classified the red flags as follows: 12 attitude or rationalization red flags, 14 opportunity red flags, and 16 incentive 
or pressure red flags.  The external auditors perceived 15 red flags as more effective, another 15 red flags as effective, 
and the remaining 12 red flags as less effective in detecting fraud.   In comparison, the internal auditors perceived 12 
red flags as more effective, another 11 red flags as effective, and the remaining 19 red flags as less effective in 
detecting fraud.  The top portion of Table 4 classifies the 42 red flags into the three SAS No. 99 categories and then 
groups the red flags into the three level of fraud-detecting effectiveness for each auditor group.  Consistent with 
previous studies, the results of this study show that both groups of auditors identified AR red flags (external auditors: 
4.40 and internal auditors: 4.32) as most effective in detecting fraud, with the OP red flags (external auditors: 4.16 and 
internal auditors: 4.12) were deemed the second most effective, and the IP red flags (external auditors: 3.77 and 
internal auditors: 3.47) ranked the as least effective fraud indicators.  Within each of the three SAS No. 99 categories, 
the external auditors perceive the red flags as slightly more effective in detecting fraud than the internal auditors 
which is evident in the above stated means.   
 
 The middle and bottom portions of Table 4 show only those particular red flags that were perceived by either 
the external or internal auditors as being more effective in detecting fraud.  External auditors identified seven of 12 
AR red flags, six of 14 OP red flags, and only two of 16 IP red flags as more effective for detecting fraud.  Likewise, 
the internal auditors identified eight of 12 AR red flags, three of 14 OP red flags, and one of 16 red flags as being 
more effective in detecting fraud.  Internal auditors had a slightly larger number of AR red flags (eight) identified as 
                                                 
4 A complete list of SAS No. 99 red flags identified by the auditors as „more effective,‟ „average effective,‟ and „less effective,‟ is 
available from the authors. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – June 2007                                                              Volume 5, Number 6 
 20 
more effective but were considerably lower than external auditors with only three OP and one IP red flag as being 
more effective.    
 
 Among the more effective attitude/rationalization red flags shown in the middle portion of Table 4, “Known 
history of violations of securities law” was considered the most effective by both external and internal auditors, 
although the external auditors (5.22) perceived this red flag having slightly higher fraud-detecting effectiveness than 
internal auditors (4.89).  External auditors, who conduct financial statement audits would naturally be more 
knowledgeable about securities law, would consider violations of such law as more indicative of fraud than internal 
auditors. 
 
 Among the more effective opportunity red flags shown in the bottom portion of Table 4, “Significant, 
unusual, or highly complex transactions” was considered the most effective by both external and internal auditors, 
although the external auditors (4.16) perceived this red flag as barely having higher fraud-detecting effectiveness than 
internal auditors (4.12).  The internal auditors which most likely are associated with these complex transactions of 
their employers than the external auditors, and thus, internal auditors may consider such complex transactions as 
possibly involving potential fraudulent activity more than external auditors. 
 
 Among the more effective incentive/pressure red flags shown in the bottom of Table 4, “Excessive pressure 
on operating management to meet financial targets exerted by board of directors or chief executive officers” was 
considered by both external and internal auditors, although the external auditors perceived this red flag as having 
slightly higher fraud-detecting effectiveness than the internal auditors.  The external auditors possessing more of an 
outside perspective than the internal auditors would be more likely to notice excessive pressure exerted from directors 
or executive officers down to the lower managers over operations.  Such excessive pressure may be indicative of the 
occurrence of fraudulent activity. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 It is evident from this study that the perceived effectiveness of SAS No. 99 red flags in detecting fraudulent 
financial statements varies widely but is consistent with previous research findings.  External auditors seem to 
perceive red flags as more effective generally in detecting fraud than internal auditors.  For external auditors, 
significant indicators of red flag effectiveness were found with variables that measured actual “hands-on” use of red 
flags such as exposure to red flags, how often one uses red flags, the organization‟s effectiveness with red flags, and 
the use of red flags to detect fraud.  For internal auditors, the amount of internal auditing experience directly impacted 
one‟s perception of the effectiveness of red flags.  In general, more experienced internal auditors perceived the 42 red 
flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than less experienced internal auditors.  For both external and internal 
auditors, gender also accounted for differences in perceptions.  Surprisingly, female auditors rated the red flags 
consistently more effective in the detection of fraudulent activity than male auditors.  Based on significant differences, 
the external auditors and internal auditors disagreed about the perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of 17 
out of the 42 SAS No. 99 red flags.  Based on the fraud-triangle and consistent with previous studies, it is apparent 
that both external and internal auditors perceived the attitude/rationalizations (AR) red flags to be the more effective 
red flags than opportunity (OP) red flags, which were also perceived to be more effective than the incentive/pressure 
(IP) red flags.  Given the post-Enron mentality of the government and stockholders, the discovery of fraudulent 
activity rests squarely on the shoulders of the audit professionals.  Further research into why auditors have such varied 
opinions concerning these audit tools like red flags need to be conducted to insure the proper use of red flags in future 
audits. 
 
As in all studies, there are some limitations which that must be recognized.  Even though the questionnaire 
was pre-tested and validated, it is still possible that some misinterpretation of the questions might have occurred.  
While the size of this sample is adequate and acceptable for this type of research, the response rates were low and it is 
possible the sample might not be representative of the population of auditors in the United States.  In addition, all of 
the self-reported demographic information is true and accurate without question. 
 
The author is indebted to Raymond M. Landry, Jr., Ph.D. for his assistance. 
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Table 1 
Demographics on External and Internal Auditors (%) 
 External Auditors  Internal Auditors 
What is your 
exposure to red 
flags? 
None Slightly Moderately Extensive Extreme  None Slightly Moderately Extensive Extrem
e 
6 26 43 23 2  3 28 41 25 3 
How often do 
you use red 
flags? 
Never Rarely Occasionall
y 
Frequently Always  Never Rarely Occasionall
y 
Frequently Always 
10 7 31 37 15  4 12 34 36 14 
Have you ever 
used red flags to 
detect fraud? 
Yes No     Yes No    
58 42     76 24    
Attended 
conferences on 
fraud detection 
using red flags? 
Yes No     Yes No    
48 52     54 46    
Has firm offered 
in-house red 
flag training? 
Yes No     Yes No    
29 71     20 80    
CPE hours on 
red flags and 
fraud detection? 
<=10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >25  <=10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >25 
52 16 14 3 15  42 5 18 10 25 
How effective is 
firm in using 
red flags? 
Seldom Somewhat Mostly Very Extremely  Seldom Somewhat Mostly Very Ex-
tremely 
22 34 24 17 3  16 23 42 11 8 
Position in firm Partner Manager Senior Staff   Director Manager Senior Staff  
62 22 12 4   50 19 7 24  
Professional 
Certifications 
CPA CIA CMA CFE Others  CPA CIA CMA CFE Others 
100 4 3 5 5  68 35 2 14 27 
Total years in 
any auditing 
field 
< 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 > 20  < 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 > 20 
14 13 14 12 47  9 18 17 17 39 
Firm size Big 4 Top 25 Regional Local        
25 8 11 56        
College degrees BS/BA MBA/MS PhD Other   BS/BA MBA/MS PhD Other  
100 26 8 0   100 28 1 0  
Undergraduate 
major 
Actg Finance Other 
business 
Non-
business 
  Actg Finance Other 
business 
Non-
business 
 
85 0 5 10   76 1 7 16  
Gender Male Female     Male Female    
80 20     72 28    
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Table 2 
Regression Analysis 
 External 
(p-values) 
Internal 
(p-values) 
Combined 
(p-values) 
H1 Experience    
 External auditing experience .1389 .9178 n/a 
 Internal auditing experience .9232 .0591 n/a 
 Total audit work experience .1149 .0865 .5806 
 Position .2673 .4117 n/a 
 
H2 Training    
 Conferences with red flag training .5973 .5532 .9207 
 In-house red flag training .5746 .6880 .9856 
 CPE hours on red flags .2160 .2329 .7550 
 
H3 Exposure    
 Extent of exposure to red flags .0092 .7168 .0494 
 How often you use red flags .0214 .1519 .0166 
 Organization effectiveness in using red flags .0417 .7103 .0905 
 Used red flags to detect fraud .0835 .1298 .0993 
 
H4 Firm size .2837 n/a n/a 
 
H5 Gender .0863 .0910 .0184 
 
 
Table 3 
Comparisons of Means Between External and Internal Auditors 
 External  Internal 
Red Flag Mean Var Sig Mean Var 
Known history of violations of securities law, or claims against the entity, its senior 
management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of securities laws 
5.22 1.086 ** 4.89 1.914 
Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving 
attempts to influence the scope of the auditor‟s work 
4.90 1.131  5.00 1.374 
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially occurring close to year 
end that pose difficult “substance over form” questions 
4.87 .992  4.94 1.404 
Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit his access to 
people or information or limit his ability to communicate effectively with the board of 
directors or the audit committee 
4.80 1.268 * 5.02 1.326 
Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with 
related entities are not audited or audited by another firm 
4.71 1.010  4.68 1.765 
Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or 
reporting matters 
4.58 1.230 * 4.36 1.683 
Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on 
the basis of materiality 
4.56 1.169  4.36 1.526 
Inadequate monitoring of significant internal controls 4.55 1.147 * 4.37 1.604 
Domination of management by a single person or small group in a nonowner-managed 
business without compensating controls 
4.48 1.324  4.66 1.566 
Excessive pressure on operating management or personnel to meet financial targets 
(sales and profitability incentive goals) exerted by board of directors or chief executive 
officers 
4.45 1.274  4.27 1.475 
Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions 
for which there appears to be no clear business justification 
4.40 1.656  4.29 1.959 
Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving 
reportable conditions 
4.35 1.349  4.37 1.543 
Significant portions of management‟s compensation, represented by bonuses and stock 
options, being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating 
results, financial position, or cash flow 
4.32 1.227  4.22 1.971 
Management failure to correct known reportable conditions in internal controls in a 
timely basis 
4.30 1.156  4.26 1.481 
A practice used by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third 
parties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts 
4.29 1.057  4.08 1.891 
Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity‟s stock price or 
earnings trend 
4.23 1.479 ** 3.78 2.135 
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Unrealistic profitability or trend level expectations by management in overly optimistic 
press releases or annual report messages 
4.18 1.206 * 3.97 1.634 
Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows 
while reporting earnings and earnings growth 
4.18 1.308 ** 3.77 1.913 
Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity‟s 
values or ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values 
or ethical standards 
4.17 1.361 * 4.54 1.509 
High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or 
information technology staff 
4.17 1.447  4.28 1.307 
Ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting 
process and internal control system 
4.12 1.486  4.34 1.677 
Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate 
4.10 1.179  4.11 1.544 
Unrealistic profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional 
investors, significant creditors or other external parties in overly optimistic press releases 
or annual report messages 
4.07 1.215 * 3.70 1.819 
Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding 
the completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor‟s report 
4.05 1.447  3.86 1.959 
Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in 
the entity 
3.99 1.556  3.98 1.732 
Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant 
pending transactions, such as business combinations or contract awards 
3.98 1.258 * 3.69 1.452 
Nonfinancial management‟s excessive participation in the selection of accounting 
principles or the determination of significant estimates 
3.98 1.386  4.04 1.794 
Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in 
the same industry 
3.98 1.346  3.99 1.825 
Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial 
lines of authority 
3.94 1.313  3.76 1.941 
High turnover of chief executive officers or board directors 3.89 1.686  3.86 1.859 
Operating losses making imminent threat of bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile 
takeover. 
3.84 1.594 * 3.56 2.005 
An interest by management employing inappropriate means to minimize reported 
earnings for tax-motivated reasons 
3.80 1.339 * 4.23 2.094 
Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment 3.79 1.269 * 3.47 1.592 
Management and/or board directors holding significant financial interests in the entity 3.70 1.675  3.50 2.314 
Management and/or board directors have personally guaranteed significant debts of the 
entity 
3.63 1.743  3.71 2.253 
A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector that allows the 
entity to dictate terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that  may result in 
inappropriate or not arm‟s length transactions 
3.47 1.307  3.45 1.817 
Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing of major research and development or 
capital expenditures to stay competitive 
3.47 1.441 *** 2.89 1.393 
High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins 3.38 1.189 * 3.12 1.408 
Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in the industry 
or overall economy 
3.37 .960 * 3.03 1.673 
Significant operations located or conducted across international borders in jurisdictions 
where differing business environments and cultures exist 
3.23 1.445 * 2.90 1.510 
High vulnerability to rapid changes in technology, product obsolescence, or interest rates 3.21 1.034  3.15 1.725 
New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements 2.76 .951  2.62 1.239 
*  significant below .10     ** significant below .01     *** significant below .001 
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Table 4 
SAS No. 99 Categories of Red Flags 
 Attitude or 
Rationalization 
(12 red flags) 
 
Opportunity 
(14 red flags) 
Incentives or 
Pressures 
(16 red flags) 
 External Internal External Internal External Internal 
More Effective 7 8 6 3 2 1 
Effective 4 3 6 4 5 4 
Less Effective 1 1 2 7 9 11 
Average 4.40 4.32 4.16 4.12 3.77 3.47 
 
More Effective 
Attitude / Rationalization Red Flags 
External 
Mean 
Internal 
Mean 
Known history of violations of securities law, or claims against the entity, its senior management, or board 
members alleging fraud or violations of securities laws  
5.22 4.89 
Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving attempts to influence the 
scope of the auditor‟s work 
4.90 5.00 
Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit his access to people or information or 
limit his ability to communicate effectively with the board of directors or the audit committee 
4.87 5.02 
Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters 4.80 4.36 
Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the basis of materiality 4.71 4.36 
Management failure to correct known reportable conditions in internal controls in a timely basis 4.58 4.26 
A practice used by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third parties to achieve 
aggressive or unrealistic forecasts 
4.56 4.08 
Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity‟s stock price or earnings trend --- 3.78 
 
More Effective 
Opportunity Red Flags 
  
Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially occurring close to year end that pose difficult 
“substance over form” questions 
4.87 4.94 
Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related entities are not 
audited or audited by another firm 
4.71 4.68 
Inadequate monitoring of significant internal controls 4.55 4.37 
Domination of management by a single person or small group in a nonowner-managed business without 
compensating controls 
4.48 --- 
Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for which there appears 
to be no clear business justification 
4.40 --- 
Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving reportable conditions 4.35 --- 
 
More Effective 
Incentives / Pressures Red Flags 
  
Excessive pressure on operating management or personnel to meet financial targets (sales and profitability 
incentive goals) exerted by board of directors or chief executive officers 
4.45 4.27 
Significant portions of management‟s compensation, represented by bonuses and stock options, being 
contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow 
4.32 --- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Business & Economics Research – June 2007                                                              Volume 5, Number 6 
 26 
NOTES 
 
 
 
 
